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Part 2 
 
Law of Corporate Governance in India 
 
 
I Introduction 
 
 
1. Importance of Corporate Governance 
 
The concept of corporate governance has its origin to the agency problems in a company, 
i.e., the issues concerning with the relationship between corporate management and 
shareholders with an aim to put their relationship in proper perspective. These issues have 
extensive ramifications, with consequences for both the efficiency of companies and for 
the overall efficiencies and growth of economies. They have become increasingly 
significant because of the process of globalization-increasing international trade, 
competition, cross border capital flows and international finance. With the development 
of international financial markets, the issues of corporate governance have become less 
domestic and more global. 
 
From the corporate perspective, a governance system is a framework of laws, regulatory 
institutions and reporting requirements that conditions the way the corporate sector is 
managed. The governance issue, therefore, is to ensure that management’s interests are 
aligned with those of shareholders. This focus on shareholder is justified by recognizing 
that other suppliers of capital (both human and financial) have mechanisms through 
which they can protect their interests after having committed their capital.1
 
Furthermore, the modern corporations are large organizations requiring a huge capital 
investment. The large amounts of capital required could only be raised by pooling the 
savings of a multitude of investors, who must rely on a competent group of persons to 
manage their investments and run the companies. Thus, the set of legal rules, incentives, 
and behaviors that support and underlie that reliance by investors on Board of Directors 
constitute the system of corporate governance.2
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A starting question may be that why a company would wish to rely on external finance at 
all. The answer is that it is cheaper to finance through the stock market. Stock market 
equity reduces the corporate cost of capital by opening up the potential supply of capital. 
A lower cost of capital for the company (or a nation’s economy) increases profitability, 
economic growth, and international competitiveness. The shareholders are the bearers of 
the residual risk of the firm, enabling others to contract with it on more definite terms. As 
such, it leaves the shareholder potentially quite vulnerable to managers who may act 
incompetently or in their own interest. 
 
If the position of shareholders cannot be well protected by contract, then how can it be 
made secure? There are two principal mechanisms through which it can be done. One is 
through legal principles of fiduciary relationship that require managers (agents) to act in 
the best interests of shareholders (principals). The other is corporate governance, i.e., a 
set of provisions that enable the shareholders by exercising voting power to compel those 
in operating control of the firm to respect their interests. The fiduciary rules can address 
conflicts of interest; the issues of managerial competence fall in the domain of corporate 
governance.3
 
The corporate governance, in fact, is an issue mainly for minority shareholders in 
companies that are controlled by the managers and where there are no significant 
shareholders, they can easily work together. In such a situation, the shareholders can still 
exert control through the board to protect their interests, but they may face formidable 
difficulties in acting together and actually doing so. Thus, in practical sense, corporate 
governance is important as a means of reducing the “agency costs” imposed by managers, 
acting in their own interests to the detriment of shareholders. 
 
The phrase corporate governance is often applied narrowly to the issues related to the 
structure and functioning of board of directors or the rights and prerogatives of 
shareholders in boardroom decision-making. The much broader view of corporate 
governance refers to the whole set of legal, cultural, socials and institutional 
arrangements that determine what publicly traded corporations can do, who controls them, 
how that control is exercised, what constraints and requirements are imposed on those 
who manage corporations, whose interests managers must serve, and what influence and 
recourse the various constituents have. Corporate governance thus extends for beyond the 
confines of corporate law. It also include boardroom practices, corporate finance, 
securities and bankruptcy law, laws governing the behavior of financial institutions, 
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contract law, and labour relation practices. Corporate governance is sine-qua-non for 
vibrant growth of corporates today. 
 
 
2. Different Systems of Corporate Governance 
 
Governance systems differ across countries. Monitoring of managers and the monitoring 
entities vary largely on the ownership structure of the equity and corporations, the role of 
the banking system in the economy, business circumstances, the efficient functioning of 
the capital markets and the level of the product market and capital market competition, 
both domestic and international. The corporate governance system also incorporates the 
financial system since the latter has a role to play in conditioning behaviour of the 
corporate sector. 
 
Any financial system has two primary goals: to channel resources to their most 
productive uses and to ensure that an adequate return flows to the financier. The latter is, 
of course, crucial to the former. Without a guarantee of an adequate return, funds will not 
be made available for investment. There are two basic corporate finance and governance 
systems. One is the Anglo-Saxon arm’s-length or market based or outsider controlled 
system with widely dispersed shareholders and vigorous corporate control (or takeover) 
market. The other is Japanese and German bank based or relation-based or insider 
controlled system with large bank and inter-corporate holdings.4
 
The market-based system has reliance on capital markets and the market for corporate 
control along with the focus on shareholders as the prime stakeholders. Another 
distinguishing characteristic of this system is the presence of widely held companies. 
Banks play relatively minor role in governance functions. Alternatively, reliance on 
banking relationship, inter-corporate holdings and concentrated holdings of equity is the 
basis of relationship-based corporate governance system. Relationship-based system 
ensure a return to the financier by granting her some form of power (implicit or explicit 
ownership) over the firm being financed. In contrast with this, in the Anglo-Saxon system, 
the financier is protected by explicit contracts. In such a system, contracts and market 
become more important medium in determining the terms of transactions. 5  Another 
important distinction between these two systems is their different degree of reliance on 
legal enforcement. Relationship-based system can survive in environment where laws are 
poorly drafted or contracts not enforced- as relationship is largely self-governing and the 
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parties intent on maintaining their reputations, honor the spirit of agreements in order to 
ensure a steady flow of future business within the same network of firms. By contrast, the 
prompt and unbiased enforcement of contracts by courts is a pre-condition for the 
viability of a market-based system. For this reason, the market-based system is found 
largely in countries with a common-law tradition, including India. 
 
One more distinction between the two systems is the relative importance of transparency. 
Market-based system requires transparency as a guarantee of protection. By contrast, 
relationship-based system is designed to preserve opacity or secrecy, which has the effect 
of protecting relationships from the threat of competition. However, an important 
ingredient in both the corporate governance systems is monitoring of managerial activity 
by various elements of the system. Monitoring can be undertaken either by the board of 
directors, individual shareholders, concentrated holders of shares such as mutual funds 
and pension funds, bondholders, banks or workers. Monitoring is facilitated by the 
presence of information on the firm and this can be generated pursuant to loan 
agreements or general shareholder information. While ‘hands-on’ monitoring function is 
provided by board of directors or banks, monitoring is also reinforced at annual meetings 
through shareholder proposals and proxy voting. Financial institutions can play a crucial 
role in monitoring the companies. 
 
Solutions to Corporate governance problem under Market-based System: Markets 
provide monitoring arrangements, incentives and disciplinary techniques to achieve 
strong managerial performance. On the incentive side, the principles on which 
management compensation is based are presented in the annual report along with the 
salaries, bonuses and contingent compensation of senior management. By using 
compensation tied to share price, for example, management is expected to make decisions 
that lead to higher share prices. Share price performance provides an indication of 
management success. 
 
Board of directors is legally and practically charged with directing and managing the 
business of the corporation on behalf of the owners. Some aspects are delegated to 
management. In meeting its obligations, the board must be vigilant in overseeing 
management’ actions with the ultimate goal of shareholder wealth maximization. Their 
general responsibilities, beyond management oversight, are to adopt corporate strategy, to 
appoint and monitor senior management, to communicate with shareholders and other 
stakeholders, and to ensure that internal control systems and management information 
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systems are in place and function effectively. The access to up-to-date information is 
crucial for the board to do an effective job. In addition to the monitoring activities of 
shareholders and board of directors, markets provide a monitoring and, in some situations, 
a disciplinary function. The markets considered are of securities (capital market), 
corporate control, managers and the product market. 
 
1. Capital Market: Transactions in equity are undertaken in the securities market. In deep 
and liquid markets, the share price is an estimate of the value of the equity of the 
company under incumbent management and the impact of any entrenchment devices the 
management has introduced. The capital market monitors the company in the sense that 
the security price provides a signal of management’s success. 
 
2. Market for Corporate Control: The market for corporate control is very important to 
solve the principal-agent problem. Poor performance leads to a low share price. A 
potential acquirer believing that it can improve the performance of the company either by 
removing management, altering operations or generating economies of scale will either 
make a friendly bid for the equity of the company or, if incumbent management is not 
inclined to the transaction, make a hostile bid. In some situations there is an auction in 
which there are a number of bidders. Securities regulation is designed to facilitate an 
auction. The bids are usually facilitated by the existence of one or more institutional 
investors who tender their shares to the bid and make it successful. Thus, the market for 
corporate control operates as a disciplinary mechanism for poorly performing managers 
or as a monitoring mechanism, whose existence leads incumbent management to 
decisions to maximize the wealth of company’s shareholders. The market for corporate 
control works only in a widely held company or in which share blocks are held by 
institutional investors who have no interest in supporting incumbent management, unless 
they are providing competitive returns. 
 
3. Market for Managers: The market for managers is an informal one but can be very 
effective in monitoring and disciplining managers. Management, in order to maintain its 
marketability, operates the firm to achieve strong returns. A poorly performing manager 
will have difficulty finding a new job. It provides the incentive for the managers to 
operate in the interests of the firm. Managers, unless entrenched and insulated from 
losing their positions, should be interested in their marketability, which is related to their 
managerial performance and reputation. As managers are generally professional, their 
reputations are crucial for future employment at other corporations. 
57
4. Product Market: The final market is the product market. If a company operates poorly 
relative to its competitors, it will find itself in a financial distress and in the extreme, 
bankrupt. This will result in a restructuring of the operations and asset holdings and in 
some cases the replacement of management. Government policies concerning domestic 
and international competition in product markets are very important in the effective 
functioning of the product market. 
 
Other Solutions: The market-based corporate governance system provides solution to 
principal-agent problem also by some other internal and external techniques. On the 
internal side, there are number of ways to improve managerial behaviour. The first is the 
use of compensation contracts related to the performance of the company. These 
contracts include stock options or similar contracts to pay-off to managers when the 
company’s share price increases above some threshold value. These contracts are costly 
to shareholders but with an improved alignment of interests, the expected benefits exceed 
costs. However, board oversight and internal controls are essential to control excess in 
this direction. The second technique is monitoring by an effective board of directors. 
Measures to ensure an effective board include director’s legal liability, the use of truly 
independent directors, and equity ownership by board members. The third method is 
monitoring by shareholders whose holdings are large enough to over come the free-rider 
problem. These shareholder groups need to have sufficient votes to pose a credible threat 
to management or have sufficient influence to lead other shareholders to question 
management’s behaviour and agitate for change. Corporate managements are usually 
very distressed by activist shareholders. 
 
However, the market-based system has some problems. For example, with the 
introduction of management entrenchment devices such as poison pills, altered board 
structures or increase in debt component in capital structures, all solutions to the 
principal-agent problem are blunted. However, this system provides flexibility and a 
number of approaches to address the issue. 
 
 
3. Impact of Legal Traditions and the Rule of Law on Corporate Governance6
 
As evident, despite its universal importance and a considerable international exchange of 
ideas and institutions, corporate governance system differs, even among advanced market 
economies. The most important cause of international diversity among corporate 
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governance systems is the existence of several distinctive legal traditions across countries. 
These traditions shape the specific rights and protections that investors enjoy in their 
interactions with the companies. In addition, the extent to which contracts are legally 
enforced- called the rule of law – also influences how effective corporate governance is 
in a particular country. 
 
Different Legal Traditions: 
The two most important broad legal traditions are civil law and common law. Other 
traditions - such as Jewish law, Canon law, Hindu law and Muslim law – are religious 
and quasi-legal and are not relevant for investor protection and corporate governance. 
The common-law tradition is found in the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, other 
English-speaking countries and countries whose modern development was heavily 
influenced by the English-speaking world. India follows the common-law tradition. In the 
common-law legal tradition, precedents from judicial decisions, rather than contributions 
of legal scholars, shape the law. The civil-law tradition is found in continental Europe 
and other countries that are heavily influenced by continental Europeans. The civil, or 
“Romano-Germanic”, legal tradition is much older than the common law. Civil law uses 
statutes and comprehensive codes as the primary means of organizing its legal principles. 
It relies on legal scholars to interpret the code and draft new interpretations and rules than 
building on judicial precedents alone. The civil-law tradition can be further sub-divided 
into Scandinavian civil-law tradition, German civil-law tradition, and the French civil-
law tradition. 
 
Legal traditions matter for corporate governance and corporate performance because they 
are systematically related to patterns in the type of legal rights and protections available 
to creditors and other investors. These rights and protections, in turn, affect the types of 
financing available to the companies. 
 
1. Creditor Rights: Creditor rights are more complex than shareholder rights in two 
respects. First, there are typically multiple classes of creditors including secured and 
unsecured creditors. Secondly, in case of financial distress, creditors must choose 
between two quite distinct strategies. They can either liquidate the company or, 
alternatively, attempt to reorganize and resuscitate it – means risking total loss in the 
future. Reorganization may be difficult and contentious, especially if incumbent 
management retains control rights while the reorganization proceeds. 
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2. Shareholder Rights: Company laws of a country largely determine the nature of 
shareholder rights. It may provide for six different types of shareholder rights and in 
addition other measures that affect dividend pay-outs and the conduct of annual meetings. 
If present, each of the following six shareholder rights provides an important investor 
guarantee: 
 
1. One share-one vote; 
 
2. Proxy voting by mail; 
 
3. Shares are not blocked before a general meeting; 
 
4. Cumulative voting or proportional representation (to allow minority interests 
to gain representation on the board); 
 
5. An oppressed minority mechanism (allowing either judicial redress or a 
mandatory buy-out of shareholders who are opposed to fundamental changes 
in company bylaws); 
 
6. Pre-emptive rights to purchase new equity issues. 
 
In addition to these six, the law may provide for two other measures of shareholder 
rights: 
 
1. Percentage of share capital needed to call an extra-ordinary shareholder 
meeting (a lower number signifies better shareholder right). 
 
2. The percentage of net income that by law must be paid out as a dividend. 
 
The common law countries provide the strongest legal protection of both creditor and 
shareholder rights. However, under this system, the effective corporate governance 
requires not just a strong legal framework of investor protections, but also a strong 
culture of rule of law.7
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Rule of Law 
Legal rights of shareholders and creditors to receive certain cash flows and to participate 
in various corporate decision-making activities, though necessary but are not sufficient 
conditions for effective corporate governance. A climate of respect for the rule of law is 
also needed. Thus, a core set of shareholder and creditor rights and an established 
tradition of legal enforcement of these rights are complementary features of an effective 
system of corporate governance. The following five enforcements variables define the 
rule of a law in a country, in addition to the quality of accounting standards: 
 
1. The efficiency of the judicial system 
 
2. An assessment of the law and order tradition 
 
3. An index of government corruption 
 
4. The risk of expropriation 
 
5. The risk of reputation of a contract by the government 
 
 
II. LEGAL REFORM OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
INDIA 
 
1. Corporate Governance: Problem in India 
 
In India, the majority of companies, even the listed ones, are family controlled. The 
controlling shareholder is involved in management either directly or indirectly. The 
financial institutions, which hold shares for portfolio purposes, may provide a monitoring 
but not operational role, so they are not considered controlling shareholders. This 
concentrated ownership generates serious problems for minority shareholders and has a 
depressing effect on the economic growth. There are potential costs of minority 
shareholders in companies in which there is a controlling shareholder. The presence of a 
controlling position gives management an entrenched position. If decisions are made that 
do not benefit all shareholders and thus depress share price, the market for corporate 
control and the market for managers cannot operate to discipline poor managerial 
performance. If one goes by the principal-agent concept, the misalignment of interests of 
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